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MA Anto Bajo 
 
A National Treasury in Croatia – a Reality 
or a Possibility? 
 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MF) does not know the precise number of government kuna (Croatian currency) and 
foreign currency accounts kept in the commercial banks. Also unknown are the amounts in these accounts, and the 
conditions (interest rate) under which the government deposits its money here. The problem is that in the MF there is no 
management of cash, and there are no clearly defined authorities for managing the public debt. The Croatian National 
Bank (CNB) also has the problem of not covering in its monetary statistics the situation of the resources in kuna and 
foreign currency kept by local government units (LGU) in the banks. In addition, there is also the problem of the Payments 
Clearance Institute (PCI), the role of which in the system of government finances has not been defined. 
The reason for this kind of situation is the fact that there is no national or government treasury system, payments 
are not made from a single treasury account (for all ministries, extra-budgetary funds and local units) and there is no clear 
regulation of payments clearance through the government accounts. We should recall that the project for the national 
treasury and payments from a single treasury account at the CNB started in 1994 has still not been put into practice. 
The establishment of the national treasury and the single account of the treasury, and getting them to work, are 
becoming increasingly important when one considers that there are no clearly settled relations or responsibilities for the 
key “fiscal agents” (the MF, the CNB and the PCI) in the system of government finances.  The most recent statutory 
approaches have created an additional confusion from the point of view of the organisation and functioning of the national 
treasury, and of payment from the single account of the treasury. 
This paper discusses what has to be done so that the small Croatian government should have more control of the 
costs of the use of  their funds. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
   In the last ten years the system of Croatian 
government finances has been faced with constant problems 
relating to the control and management of public expenditure 
and revenue. This is the result of the lack of a defined role for 
the key institutions that are linked (or not linked) with the 
government, i.e., the Ministry of Finance, by financial 
relationships. The inability to see into the real situation of the 
government's finances, the state of its deposits or the number 
of accounts kept in the commercial banks is a systematic 
hindrance to the government in the regular daily and monthly 
determination of real needs in the public sector, and the 
amount of the funds needed to finance expenditure. The 
numerous accounts of the government in the commercial  
banks lead to questions about the number of such accounts  
 
 
 
and the amount of the funds kept in them. Apart from that,  
the banks make use of the deposits and funds of the 
government to carry on their own commercial activities. Every 
failure of any such bank must necessarily have the result of the 
government funds it made use of actually disappearing1. Of 
course, the costs of this disappearance will have to be borne 
once again by the taxpayer. The regulation of the finances of 
the government in such a way as at last to set up the national 
treasury system (the governmental financial and information 
management system) and getting the single account of the 
                                              
1 For example, in May 1999, bankruptcy proceedings were started in a certain number of 
banks that were for this reason excluded from monetary statistics.  According to data from 
April 1999, deposits of the central government in these banks came to 193,5 million kuna 
(CNB Bulletin, 2001:76).  As against this, the claims of these banks against the central 
government came to 17,8 million kuna (ibid:75).  The government, that is, lost 175,5 million 
kuna through these bankruptcies. 
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treasury working would solve for the government many 
problems about making payments and the management of 
cash and the public debt. It is crucial that the government 
should finally start to regulate the relation between the 
Ministry of Finance (treasury department) with the CNB, the 
Payments Clearance Institute and the commercial banks within 
the system of government finances. 
For this reason, in the sequel we shall draw attention 
to the basic problems that make it impossible to determine the 
amount of the funds that the state has at its disposal, the 
possibilities and preconditions for the establishment of the 
government or national treasury, and through the current 
organisational and functional solutions of the national treasury 
and single account of the treasury system to address the 
problems as well as the recommendations for the ultimate 
functioning of the treasury system. 
 
 
I. The problem of the control of public revenue 
and expenditure 
 
For the banks, the government is “the mother of all 
clients”. And so in a centralised state like Croatia, transfers via 
the government accounts are both high and constantly 
maintained. However, unlike the other services that 
government institutions and companies arrive at via public 
tender invitations, the choice of bank in which to open an 
account is left to individual budgetary beneficiaries. The 
problem here is that not even in the MF (treasury department) 
are the criteria for choice of bank known, and there is no 
information about any uniformity in the conditions of 
individual banks. The MF should, at the same time as it 
ensures the functioning of the government treasury, pick the 
best offers for the provision of financial services such as 
opening government giro accounts. The necessity of such 
measures is shown by the many giro accounts that have been 
opened in the commercial banks. 
That is, there are 1,635 budgetary beneficiary 
accounts open in numerous commercial banks. Most of them 
have been opened in Zagrebacka (449), Privredna (201), 
Splitska (175), Rijecka (154) and Slavonska (131) banks. The 
accounts of other beneficiaries are split up among the other 
commercial banks in a range of from 65 to a single account in 
a bank. Although the accounts are in the banks, all the 
payments clearance related to these government accounts goes 
on via ZAP, Zavod za platni promet (the Payments Clearance 
Institute), which takes a fee for this service. To do with rate of 
interest, Zagrebacka banka, for instance, in 2000, paid an 
interest of 1% per year on giro accounts that it keeps in ZAP 
(and the accounts of the budgetary beneficiaries).  To the 
hundreds of such accounts one has to add the accounts of 
local government units (the 544 communes and cities and the 
21 counties) and the beneficiaries of their budgets, and the 
circa 7,700 transient accounts at the CNB for the collection of 
national and local taxes.  The ministries and government 
agencies have about 60 accounts in the CNB, and the 
budgetary final beneficiaries have 474 of a total of 2,150 
accounts (Mateljic: 2000). Apart from the great number of 
accounts, the state also has a problem with carrying on 
payments clearing. 
From February 2001, the National Clearing System 
started working; the authorities for payments clearing were 
transferred to the banks. However, the problem appeared of 
whether the banks would actually check to see whether taxes 
and contributions were paid. Hitherto, this had been done for 
the government by ZAP, which got a fee for the service. The 
banks, apparently, in their requests to have this obligation 
transferred to them, have the support of the CNB. And for 
this reason there is a banks-ZAP-CNB problem, that is, the 
question of which of these institutions should in the future 
(when the banks take over payments clearing) assume the role 
of ZAP, which has so far controlled the payment and 
collection of taxes and contributions for the government, i.e., 
for the Ministry of Finance. 
Part of the answer is provided by the new CNB law, 
in which the relationship between the government and the 
CNB is laid down. Thus, according to the proposal, the CNB 
will run the accounts of the government in its liabilities (as it 
has done to date) and carry out payments clearing to do with 
these accounts. The CNB should work as fiscal agent for 
issuing securities. Apart from that, it will carry out payments 
from the account at the order of the government up to the 
amount of the funds deposited in the account. The amount of 
interest and fees will be jointly agreed on by the MF and the 
CNB according to market conditions. Of course, the CNB 
will charge a fee for carrying out payments clearance services. 
It is interesting that the CNB can authorise some other 
institution to carry out payments clearing with respect to the 
government accounts, all in accord with the conditions 
prescribed by the CNB, with the consent of the MF. 
However, one question is which that institution is to be (the 
banks, ZAP). 
All this brings us to the key problem: how will the 
government organise the control of the collection of its 
revenues and the use of the expenditure of the Budget, the 
extra-budgetary funds and the local government units? 
And this truly is the crucial problem for the 
government, that is for the main fiscal institution, the Finance 
Ministry, the answer to it lying in the functioning of the 
system of the treasury and the single account of the treasury 
opened at the CNB.  
 
 
II. The treasury system – possibilities and 
preconditions 
  
The system of a treasury on an integrated centralised 
basis provides the central government with financial services 
such as payments, accounting, fiscal reporting and financial 
management. Most of the developed countries have a 
computerised system that unites all the functions for the MF 
and the other ministries, as well as the government agencies 
and their spending units. This system contains so called 
modules for the preparation of the budget, debt management, 
the extra-budgetary funds, local units and other functions. 
However, the construction of a government treasury system 
consists of four main components: 1) creation, within the MF, 
a treasury department  that via its regional offices will collect 
revenue and make  government payments; 2) consolidation of 
government financial resources in a “single treasury account” 
in the central bank; 3) the introduction of a better accounting  
regime for government operations through a “treasury general 
ledger” and 4) the development of financial management and 
the planning for the  government sector. 
It has to be known that the treasury system is a 
linked system of payments, accounting and a financial and 
2
 
 
2 The English word budgeting means the whole process of allocating resources, and the preparation of special documents, ie, laws, through which the allocation of resources takes on the 
nature of an obligation (Snyder, 1977: 99). 
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information management system, access to which is given to 
the Finance Minister, the treasury department, the ministries 
and the government agencies. All these may draw up payment 
orders, but only the treasury department can approve such 
orders for payment. Authority of this kind enables the treasury 
department to act preventively and to limit excessive 
government spending. Payment operations via the treasury and 
the accounting operations of the ministries, agencies and the 
treasury are the basis for the establishment of the standard 
financial and management information system of the 
government. This kind of centralised approach is possible only 
with a high level of computerisation, both in the MF and in 
the ministries, the extra-budgetary funds and the local 
government units. 
 
 
III. The existing system of the government 
treasury – the reality 
 
Practice with government finances to date has shown 
weaknesses in the analysis of fiscal policy, lack of control of 
expenditure, weak or nonexistent cash management and 
inefficient supervisory and information systems for the fiscal 
operations of the government. This kind of situation 
contributes in a major way to the uncertainty in decision-
making about the allocation of government resources. For this 
reason it is necessary to set up a treasury and a governmental 
financial information system. 
The government treasury has not been allowed to 
function thanks to lack of professionalism and absence of 
long-term vision in the implementation of the reforms of the 
budget and budgetary process. One of the problems is the fear 
of budgetary beneficiaries of the possible consequences that 
the establishment of a government treasury, and payment via 
the single account of the treasury, might have. It is known that 
budgetary beneficiaries can have their own sources of funds 
and make use of them without them being recorded in the 
single account of the treasury (Ott and Bajo, 2000). Bringing 
all the funds into the national treasury system would give such 
institutions no chance of using and disposing of such funds in 
a discretionary manner. Funds would be approved and used 
via the treasury system. All such, and many other, problems 
have led to the IMF and the World Bank deciding to get 
actively involved in the establishment of the functions of the 
national treasury in the RC as well. 
Thus as long ago as 1996, Croatia was given a Public 
Sector Adjustment Loan, PSAL .  This loan provided funds for 
the organisation of the treasury as an integral part of the MF. 
Problems with setting up the national treasury and the single 
account of the treasury in the CNB became additionally 
complicated in the following years.  Thus the main problems 
were related to computerisation, to the ill-defined status of 
ZAP, and the lack of adequately professional people actually 
to implement the system. Of course, the whole government 
treasury system needed greater political support, which was 
signally lacking. Thus the whole process of the reform of the 
preparation, planning and execution and control of the 
national budget was drawn out. 
In 2000, the question of the work of the treasury was 
once again mooted. American advisers to the MF about the 
establishment of the government treasury, according to the 
situation as found in the MF, laid down the basic principles 
for the reform of the budget. 
 
 
 
These principles have to be the framework for the organisation of the system of the national treasury, and this would greatly improve 
the system of the budget. 
In June 2000, the government of the RC made a Decree about the internal organisation of the Ministry of Finance (Official 
Gazette 65/00), which defines the organisation of the treasury department. This decree states that the treasury consists of 
administrations  for the execution of the national budget, for government accounting, and for managing cash and the public debt. 
It is interesting that no administration for preparing and consolidating the budget(s) is included in the treasury, although the 
Instruction about the execution of the national budget from the single treasury account (OG 4/01) anticipates an active role for this 
administration in the treasury system.  A classic administrative mistake in timing, one might say. 
The government treasury is defined as an administrative organisation that is part of the MF and has responsibilities for 
carrying out matters relating to the execution of the national budget, government accounting, cash and public debt management. This 
kind of organisation has created a confusion in the organisation of the treasury, and determined a function for it that is essentially 
different from the previously proposed functional principles for the reform of the budget. 
The actual definition of the treasury as administrative organisation in the MF has not been completely illuminated, and the 
roles of the administrations have not been precisely defined, nor have those of the departments that actually make up the treasury. The 
question arises about the role of the chief treasurer and what knowledge and skills this treasurer needs to have, as well as the highly 
placed administrators of the department of the budget of the MF included in the treasury. 
The  national  treasury  project  was  not  completed  in  2000,  although  most  of  the  technical  parts  of  the  project  were  in  
their  concluding  phases.  In  the  functional  part,  the  basic  solutions  for  most  of  the  tasks  have  not  been  giving,  and  thus  “via  
the  national  treasury  it  is  not  possible  to  plan  the  budget,  execute  the  budget,  manage  monetary  flows  or  monitor  
borrowing  at  the  level  of  the  country”  (Linzbauer,  2000:255).    This  statement  surely  goes  for  2001  as  well.    For  this  reason  it  
is  still  not  clear  who  in  the  MF,  and  how,  manages  cash  and  the  public  debt.  Four  revisions  of  the  budget  in  the  last  six  
years  have  additionally  confirmed  the  point  that  the  existing  organisation  of  the  treasury  does  not  facilitate  any  realistic  
budget  planning.    
 
 
Principles for Budget reform in RC 
 
A modern integrated system of financial management has three main functional components that cover the budget, 
accounting and the treasury (including debt management) operations.  
Budgetary functions  comprise the policy objectives and decisions of the government, the requirements of ministries 
and other budgetary beneficiaries for financing, adjustments among the ministries in parliament. This includes the allocation of 
funds to the ministries, which ought to be adjusted with the plans of the work of the Ministers, and the anticipated amounts of 
cash through the functions of the treasury. Through the activity of the allocation of funds2 one can assure regular supervision of 
the use of such funds. The allocation of funds covers all executive government agencies that obtain budgetary resources, including 
the extra-budgetary funds and the local government units. 
The functions of the treasury cover cash management, public debt (foreign and domestic) management and forecasting 
and risk management. As part of cash management, the treasury manages government deposits as a consolidated account. The 
treasury supervises the collection of revenue, prepares cash flow forecast and advises on short-term financing requirements. As 
part of debt management, the treasury records issuance of government securities, register liabilities of the government, forecast 
debt levels and debt servicing requirements, and manages loan agreements.  The treasury also works as financial adviser by 
monitoring market conditions (trends in interest rates and foreign currency exchange rates), projecting payment obligations and the 
needs to get into debt, and estimates the position of the government on the market. 
The function of accounting includes the financial system of the recording of transactions, accounting rules, data, 
reporting, supervision and control. All transactions generated from the budget, and the function of the treasury, are covered by the 
accounting system. The accounting function has to be kept separate from the other two functions (USAID and the US Treasury, 
June 2000) 
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These principles have to be the framework for the 
organisation of the system of the national treasury, and this 
would greatly improve the system of the budget. 
In June 2000, the government of the RC made a 
Decree about the internal organisation of the Ministry of 
Finance (Official Gazette 65/00), which defines the 
organisation of the treasury department. This decree states 
that the treasury consists of administrations for the execution 
of the national budget, for government accounting, and for 
managing cash and the public debt. 
It is interesting that no administration for preparing 
and consolidating the budget(s) is included in the treasury, 
although the Instruction about the execution of the national 
budget from the single treasury account (OG 4/01) anticipates 
an active role for this administration in the treasury system.  A 
classic administrative mistake in timing, one might say. 
The government treasury is defined as an 
administrative organisation that is part of the MF and has 
responsibilities for carrying out matters relating to the 
execution of the national budget, government accounting, cash 
and public debt management. This kind of organisation has 
created a confusion in the organisation of the treasury, and 
determined a function for it that is essentially different from 
the previously proposed functional principles for the reform 
of the budget. 
The actual definition of the treasury as administrative 
organisation in the MF has not been completely illuminated, 
and the roles of the administrations have not been precisely 
defined, nor have those of the departments that actually make 
up the treasury. The question arises about the role of the chief 
treasurer and what knowledge and skills this treasurer needs to 
have, as well as the highly placed administrators of the 
department of the budget of the MF included in the treasury. 
The national treasury project was not completed in 
2000, although most of the technical parts of the project were 
in their concluding phases. In the functional part, the basic 
solutions for most of the tasks have not been giving, and thus 
“via the national treasury it is not possible to plan the budget, 
execute the budget, manage monetary flows or monitor 
borrowing at the level of the country” (Linzbauer, 2000:255).  
This statement surely goes for 2001 as well.  For this reason it 
is still not clear who in the MF, and how, manages cash and 
the public debt. Four revisions of the budget in the last six 
years have additionally confirmed the point that the existing 
organisation of the treasury does not facilitate any realistic 
budget planning.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The single account of the treasury 
  
Apart from the organisation and functional 
organisation of the budget, there is also a great problem in the 
position of the single account of the treasury opened at the 
CNB. In the MF they have remarked well that “in the history 
of market developed economies it is a widespread practice to 
concentrate sources of cash or monetary resources in a single 
bank account, i.e., at a single account of the treasury in the 
central bank. In industrialised countries with a well-developed 
computer support and an effective payments clearance system 
run by the banks, the treasury system can operate from many 
accounts and management of the total monetary potential is 
not called into question” (Keser, 2000:92).  
Problems to do with the single account of the treasury in 
the RC derive from:  
· the ill-defined status of ZAP which actually functions as, 
and partially performs the functions of, the national 
treasury; 
· the lack of any settled plan for placing all budgetary 
beneficiaries and their accounts within the purview of a 
single account opened at the CNB;  
· the absence of any government financial information 
system to provide full information about the situation 
of cash in the accounts of the budgetary beneficiaries 
or information about the precise number of accounts 
of the government (or of the budgetary beneficiaries) 
kept in the commercial banks;  
· there is no single administration for cash management in 
the MF within the treasury system; this administration 
should have an integral insight into the inflow and 
outflow of funds not only from the budget but also 
from the extra-budgetary funds.  
 
 However, it is actually the splitting up of the 
monetary resources of the government among many bank 
accounts instead of their being concentrated in a single 
account at the CNB that is the real problem with cash 
management in the RC. Thus the greater part of both kuna 
and foreign currency deposits of the state are kept in the 
commercial banks (Figure 1).  
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Government deposits with the commercial banks are 
four times greater than government deposits with the CNB. 
Thus from mid-1997, one can see a constant rise in 
government deposits at the commercial banks. Government 
deposits at the CNB have on the whole remained at a low 
level, and at the end of 2000, a slight rise to a level of 1,1 
billion kuna could be noted. 
 
 
Table 1. Kuna and foreign currency deposits of the central government (national Budget and the extra-budgetary funds) with the 
commercial banks, in billion kuna. 
 
The situation in December 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Kuna deposits 1,8 1,6 2,4 3,0 3,3 3,0 
Foreign currency deposits 0,2 0,1 4,4 4,2 2,5 3,7 
Total 2,0 1,7 6,8 7,2 5,8 6,7 
Source: CNB Bulletin no. 58 
 
 
The total level of government deposits with the 
commercial banks increased from 1,7 billion kuna in 1996 to 
7,2 billion kuna in 1998.  In December 1999, central 
government deposits in the commercial banks were 5,8 billion 
kuna, and in December 2000 these increased to 6,7 billion. 
.
 
 
Table 2. Deposits of central government with the CNB in millions of kuna 
 
The situation in December 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total deposits 395 558 1,033 435 397 1,157 
Source:  CNB Bulletin no 58 
 
 
Most of the deposits of the government (the Budget 
and the extra-budgetary funds) at the CNB have been reduced 
since 1998, from 1,03 billion kuna to only 397 million in 
December 1999.  In 2000, a rise in December can be seen, and 
government deposits were 1,1 billion kuna. One should bear 
in mind that the deposits of the Budget were incused by the 
deposits of the extra-budgetary funds falling to a minimum in 
2000, which is another proof of their very weak financial 
position (Figure 2). 
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The fact is that it is not known precisely how many 
accounts the government has at the commercial banks. There 
is no clear criterion for transferring money to the commercial 
banks. It is even quite dubious under what conditions (and at 
what rate of interest) this money is kept, and what the purpose 
of the deposits that are kept in individual banks is. Apart from 
that, the official statistics of the CNB do not show the amount 
of the kuna or foreign currency deposits of LGUs in either 
commercial banks or in the CNB. All this creates great 
confusion about the real state of the cash of the government 
kept in the commercial banks.  
In the reform of the system of the government’s 
finances, the main question is the transfer of the deposits from 
the commercial banks to the single deposit account at the 
CNB. This measure, in current conditions of economic 
insolvency, would have profound consequences, because it 
would greatly reduce the loan potentials of commercial banks. 
However, this kind of measure would help the MF to manage 
its deposits much more easily and more thoroughly. The CNB 
would have, in addition, the direct ability to control the 
situation in such accounts and to measure or predict the 
monetary consequences that can be caused by changes in the 
situation of the government’s deposits. 
It is quite another question whether the MF will 
decide on having the banks, and which of them, carry out 
payments clearance on behalf of the government, and in 
which of the banks and on what conditions (at which rate of 
interest) the government might place its funds. 
The problem becomes more complex when one knows 
that in the MF there is no apportionment of responsibility for 
the management of cash. The situation of cash in these 
accounts is also an unknown, as are the conditions in which 
such funds are deposited (short term or long term). It is even a 
problem to determine the exact amount of the monthly 
resources needed by the national Budget to overcome the 
unequal dynamics with which funds come into the budget and 
the financing of “extraordinary” expenditures that are done on 
the basis of the issue and auctioning of treasury bills. 
For this reason it is necessary to decide on the 
establishment of a treasury system that will serve several levels 
of government, and under the direct control of the central 
government, i.e., the MF. Apart from that it is necessary 
clearly to delimit the concepts of central and regional 
government treasury. Thus in the Instruction about the 
execution of the national Budget from the single account of 
the treasury (OG 4/01), the regional treasury is awkwardly 
defined as a functional and logical unit within the competent ministry. 
The concept of regional treasury has not been worked out at 
all, nor are the local units informed about the whole project of 
the establishment of the national treasury. 
New procedures for working out the precise 
dynamics and steps for closing the existing accounts of 
ministries and budgetary beneficiaries kept in the banks have 
to be brought into the central bank and the banks of 
budgetary beneficiaries.  
However, in Croatia, ZAP still makes its contract with 
the MF about looking after all matters concerned with the 
collection of revenue and payment from the accounts of the 
national budget, as well as computer affairs. Thus according to 
Article 33 of the Budget Execution Law (OF 130/00), for its 
carrying out payments transactions to do with the accounts of 
the budget and the accounts of the budgetary beneficiaries, the 
MF pays ZAP a fee according to a contract that the Minister  
 
 
makes with ZAP.  However, officially, not even the amount of 
this fee is known. 
For this reason, the establishment of the national 
treasury and payment from the single account of the treasury 
are connected with the “reform of payments clearance, and so 
also with the transfer of the account of the national Budget to 
the CNB with payments clearing according to this account” 
(Cota, 1998: 80).  For reform of payments clearance in the 
country to be put through to the end, it is expected that the 
MF will take the initiative in the regulation of payments 
clearance on behalf of the government, and other legal 
regulations through which the timetable of the implementation 
of the reform of the budgetary system would be laid down. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the sake of overall control and management of 
public revenue and expenditure, a reform of the budgetary 
system has to be undertaken, and a government or national 
treasury set up before anything else. The decision makers in 
the executive, above all in the MF and the government, have 
to speed up the completion of the project of the national 
treasury. The amount of the funds that have “got stuck” in 
some of the many government accounts opened in the 
commercial banks certainly have to be determined, and some 
control of them undertaken. Determining the amount of these 
funds and transferring them to the single account of the 
treasury at the CNB can serve as a parallel process in the 
creation of a single administration for cash management 
within the MF.  The work of this administration would be 
closely linked with the possible organisation of a Public Debt 
Management Council, in which there should be 
representatives of the CNB and the MF.  
A precondition for the implementation of these 
proposals is the establishment of a national or government 
financial information system and the recording of all the 
transactions of the government in this system, and not, as 
hitherto, via ZAP and the many banks through which 
payments are made on behalf of the government. In addition, 
it is necessary to determine the final dates for the transfer of 
accounts and payments from individual bank accounts to the 
single account of the treasury at the CNB. 
Also needing to be done is the definition of a clearer 
organisational structure of the treasury in the MF and making 
a clear-cut division of the responsibilities for the carrying out 
of given matters. This requires additional expert staffing, 
taking on new and more professionally qualified personnel in 
the MF, particularly to do with matters in the competence of 
the treasury. 
Finally, much greater political support needs to be 
given to the reform of the budgetary system, with information 
being made available to public and parliament about the 
procedures undertaken in the reform, and the possible 
consequences and results of the implementation. 
 The new laws regulating the organisation of the 
national and regional treasuries, the amendments to the 
existing budget law, the passing of a new law about the public 
debt, and the making of a fiscal responsibility law should be 
the basis for the reform of the budgetary system that has the 
characteristics of an obligation as well as settled dates for its 
implementation. 
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